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REPLY POINTS 
I. CLARIFICATION OF ISSUES PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT 
FOR DETERMINATION. 
Olympus attempts to confuse the actual issues properly before this Court for 
determination by emphasizing and arguing at length issues that are simply not 
within the scope of this Court's grant of certiorari. 
A, The failure of Olympus to reject Mr. Matthews' timely filed claim 
as mandated by statute. 
Olympus would like this Court to believe that the court of appeals' ruling 
with respect to the statute of frauds and broker licensing statute is dispositive of all 
issues presently before this Court for determination, including the failure of 
Olympus to timely reject Mr. Matthews' timely filed claim as mandated by UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1305(4) (2001). 
In reality, the timely rejection of Mr. Matthews' timely filed claim as 
mandated by UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1305(4) (2001) is a critical threshold issue 
as to whether Mr. Matthews' claim was properly contested by Olympus and 
therefore put at issue before the district court thereby enabling Olympus and the 
district court (and subsequently the court of appeals) to even reach the merits of Mr. 
Matthews' claim and the related issues of the statute of frauds and the broker 
licensing statute. 
As discussed more fully in relation to the award of attorney fees against Mr. 
Matthews, there is substantial reason to question the propriety of the court of 
appeals' ruling on the statute of frauds and broker licensing statute (which should 
be addressed by this Court when given an opportunity in an appropriate case). 
Nevertheless, because the threshold inquiry with respect to the timely rejection of 
Mr. Matthews' claim by Olympus as mandated by statute is dispositive of this 
matter, in the interests of judicial economy and efficiency Mr. Matthews has 
pursued review of the court of appeals' decision on this issue without unnecessarily 
burdening this Court with issues that are rendered moot by a determination in Mr. 
Matthews' favor on this threshold inquiry. 
B. Mr. Matthews' arguments herein did have merit for purposes of 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56 (1988). 
As discussed more fully below with respect to the award of attorney fees at 
issue herein, the without merit prong of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56 (1988) must 
be satisfied independently of the bad faith prong of that statute. Absent a proper 
finding that the arguments at issue are without merit independent of the bad faith 
inquiry, there is simply no proper basis for an award of attorney fees pursuant to 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56 (1988). 
Olympus relies upon conclusionary arguments with respect to the without 
merit prong, and then places great emphasis on the bad faith prong in an attempt to 
bootstrap a finding of without merit to a finding of bad faith. 
While Mr. Matthews denies that even the bad faith prong is satisfied in this 
matter, there is no need for this Court to even reach that issue in light of the fact that 
Mr. Matthews' arguments did indeed have merit. 
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II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN INTERPRETING AND 
APPLYING THE PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1305(4) 
(2001) AND AFFIRMING THE EXTENSION OF THE STATUTORY 
DEADLINE FOR OLYMPUS TO REJECT TIMELY FILED CLAIMS. 
A. Permissive nature of UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1305 (2001). 
It is true that notwithstanding the language of the Successor Receiver Order 
entered by the district court authorizing Olympus to set dates for the barring of 
claims and to accept or reject claims pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 48-2c-1305 (2001), Olympus was not required to do so, but rather this was simply 
an option afforded to Olympus if it subsequently chose to do so. 
However, once Olympus elected to afford itself of the claim barring aspects 
of UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1305 (2001), Olympus was bound to abide by the . 
statutory procedures and deadlines set forth therein, and Olympus was not free to 
pick and choose which portions of the statute with which it would or would not 
comply. 
B. The Claim Bar Date Order was indeed based upon UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 48-2c-1305 (2001). 
It is true that the Claim Bar Date Order entered by the district court (R. 843-
863) does not expressly reference UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1305 (2001). 
However, in light of the express language of the prior Successor Receiver Order (R. 
771-778), and the plain language of the Claim Bar Date Motion and Claim Bar Date 
Memorandum submitted to the district court by Olympus (R. 791-835) in 
conjunction with the Claim Bar Date Order proposed by Olympus, any further 
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reference to UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1305 (2001) in the Claim Bar Date Order 
would have been unduly repetitive and unnecessary. 
Paragraph 4 of the Successor Receiver Order plainly states: 
Except as otherwise provided herein the Receiver may dispose of 
known and unknown claims against Olympus by notice and/or 
publication, may set dates for the barring of such claims and may 
accept or reject claims all as provided in Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-
1305 and 1306. 
(R. 773). 
As set forth more fully in the Brief of Appellant previously filed herein, the 
Claim Bar Date Motion and Claim Bar Date Memorandum identify the language 
quoted above from the Successor Receiver Order as the express basis for entry of 
the Claim Bar Date Order and argue ad nauseam that the Claim Bar Date Order 
complies with the provisions of UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1305 (2001). 
It is also noteworthy that the Claim Bar Date Order was prepared by 
Olympus and submitted to the district court in conjunction with the Claim Bar Date 
Motion and Claim Bar Date Memorandum. 
As set forth in the Brief of Appellee filed herein, Olympus would like this 
Court to believe that in signing the Claim Bar Date Order the district court sub 
silentio rejected UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1305 (2001) as the basis relied upon by 
Olympus for entry of the Claim Bar Date Order and based the Claim Bar Date 
Order on the otherwise unexpressed (at the time the Claim Bar Date Order was 
entered) equitable powers of the district court. Such an argument simply cannot be 
reconciled with the overall facts and circumstances of this matter, especially the 
express and plain language of the Successor Receiver Order, Claim Bar Date 
Motion and Claim Bar Date Memorandum. 
Olympus also argues that "the Receiver had no authority to 'reject' or 
otherwise determine claims without adjudication by the court." Brief of Appellee, 
at p. 34. However, this argument inexplicably ignores the plain language of the 
prior Successor Receiver Order that expressly granted the Receiver the authority to 
"accept or reject claims all as provided in Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-1305." (R. 773). 
The inescapable reality is that the Claim Bar Date Order entered by the 
district court was indeed based upon UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1305 (2001). 
C. The Receiver's bankruptcy analogy is inapposite to the provisions 
of UTAH CODE ANN, § 48-2c-1305 (2001). 
The analogy that Olympus attempts to make to bankruptcy proceedings and 
the creation of a rebuttable presumption is simply inapplicable in that the 
bankruptcy laws do not establish a firm deadline by which claims are "considered 
approved" if not rejected in writing by the debtor or the trustee, and UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 48-2c-1305 (2001) is plainly written in terms of an absolute limitation on 
the pursuit of claims and defenses if not presented in a timely manner. 
It must be remembered that the subject clause in UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-
1305(4) (2001) that requires a dissolved company to reject timely filed claims 
within a specified period of time or such claims are to be "considered approved" is 
a unique provision crafted by the Utah State Legislature, who must have intended 
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that this clause have some meaning and effect. The position taken by Olympus 
would essentially render this clause meaningless without any real force or effect. 
D. Adjudication of claims against Olympus by the district court. 
It is true that the Successor Receiver Order provides that to the extent 
permitted by law, all claims filed against Olympus shall be adjudicated and 
determined by the district court in and as part of the judicial dissolution of 
Olympus. However, absent the judicial dissolution proceeding and the Successor 
Receiver Order, different creditors of Olympus would be free to file claims against 
Olympus in any number of courts. The Successor Receiver Order simply provides 
that to the extent permitted by law all claims would be decided in a single judicial 
proceeding (although at the time the Successor Receiver Order was entered none of 
the creditors of Olympus, including Mr. Matthews, was properly before the district 
court and subject to its jurisdiction). 
In applying the plain language of UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1305 (2001) to 
the facts of this case and ordering Olympus to pay Mr. Matthews5 timely filed claim 
as an approved claim, Mr. Matthews' claim would be adjudicated and determined in 
and as part of the judicial dissolution proceeding consistent with the provisions of 
the Successor Receiver Order. If Olympus had wanted to contest the merits of Mr. 
Matthews' claim, all Olympus had to do was timely reject Mr. Matthews' claim in 
writing within the statutorily prescribed time, which Olympus simply failed to do. 
Olympus argues that the need for the district court to adjudicate all claims 
against Olympus relates, at least in part, to the fact that "the issues in this judicial 
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receivership were contentious and divisive" and further that "[virtually all of the 
claims against the receivership estate invoked the partisanship of one member group 
or the other." Brief of Appellee, at p. 33. However, such an argument by Olympus 
ignores the fact that the Receiver herself was appointed as a neutral third-party to 
wind up the affairs of Olympus, including any claims against Olympus, and thereby 
eliminate the partisanship among the members of Olympus that precluded the 
members of Olympus from winding up the affairs of Olympus on their own without 
the need for a Receiver. The district court did not sua sponte decide whether a 
third-party claim against Olympus should be accepted and paid or contested and 
subject to an adjudication on its merits, but rather the district court merely 
responded to whether or not the Receiver accepted or rejected such claims, and only 
adjudicated the merits of claims when properly put at issue by the Receiver. 
E. Nature of the two-step adjudication procedure established by the 
district eourt for timely filed claims. 
Olympus argues that the second step of the two-step adjudication procedure 
established by the district court pursuant to the Claim Bar Date Motion, Claim Bar 
Date Memorandum and Claim Bar Date Order would be the Receiver coming back 
to the district court at some unspecified time in the future, the timing of which was 
in the sole and absolute discretion of the Receiver, in order to establish a deadline 
for Olympus to reject timely filed claims. However, in making this argument, 
Olympus completely ignores a third step that would then inevitably be required with 
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respect to the establishment of procedures and the timing of actually adjudicating 
the disputed claim (similar to a scheduling order in a typical civil action). 
In reality, the first step of this two-step process involved whether or not a 
claim was properly put at issue by the parties (meaning the timely filing of a claim 
by Mr. Matthews, and the timely rejection of Mr. Matthews' claim by Olympus as 
prescribed by statute), and the second step of this two-step process would then be 
the adjudication of any claim properly put at issue pursuant to procedures to be 
established by the district court after a claim had properly been put at issue (similar 
to a scheduling order in a civil action). 
In light of the express provisions of UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1305(4) 
(2001), once the district court approved a Claim Bar Date as set forth in the Claim 
Bar Date Order, there was simply no need for the district court to subsequently and 
independently establish a date by which Olympus would be required to reject timely 
filed claims in order to properly put a timely filed claim at issue for purposes of 
adjudication by the district court. 
F. Definition of "claim" in UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1305. 
Olympus argues that if the provisions of UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1305 
(2001) are applied literally in this matter as advocated by Mr. Matthews, then Mr. 
Matthews' own claim would not fall within the definition of a claim found in 
subsection (6), which states: "For purposes of this section, 'claim' does not include 
a contingent liability or a claim based on an event occurring after the effective date 
of dissolution." Once again, Olympus' argument misses the mark. 
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Mr. Matthews' claim is not contingent or based on an event occurring after 
the effective date of the dissolution of Olympus. To the contrary, Mr. Matthews' 
claim was liquidated and arose from an event—the acquisition of the subject 
property by Olympus—that occurred long before the dissolution of Olympus. 
Notably, the subject commission was earned as a result of the acquisition of the 
subject property by Olympus, and is not a commission earned in conjunction with 
the sale of the property. While the ultimate timing of the payment of this liquidated 
debt extended beyond the date of dissolution, the fact remains that the claim was 
liquidated and based upon an event that occurred prior to dissolution. To hold 
otherwise would allow companies to avoid the payment of otherwise undisputed 
debts whose terms of payment extend beyond the date of dissolution of the 
company. 
For example, according to the logic and reasoning of Olympus, if Olympus 
had obtained a loan from a bank that required a balloon payment of interest and 
principal five years after the date the loan was obtained, and two years later (before 
the balloon payment was due) Olympus went through a judicial dissolution 
proceeding and established a claim bar date pursuant to the provisions of UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1305 (2001), then the bank would be prohibited from filing a 
claim in the judicial dissolution proceeding because the otherwise undisputed debt 
owed to the bank by Olympus was not payable until after the effective date of 
dissolution, and therefore Olympus should be allowed to wind up its affairs and 
dispose of all of its assets in the judicial dissolution proceeding without paying the 
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otherwise undisputed debt to the bank. Such a result is patently incongruous with 
the purpose and intent of this statute. 
The obvious intent of the definition of a "claim" in subsection (6) for 
purposes of applying the claim barring aspects of UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1305 
(2001) is to preserve claims against companies that truly do not arise until after the 
effective date of dissolution of the company. This is simply not the case with Mr. 
Matthews' claim, which arose long before the effective date of dissolution. 
Olympus also argues (without citation to any authority) that Mr. Matthews 
did not have a valid claim as contemplated by UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1305 
(2001) because the district court and court of appeals ultimately rejected Mr. 
Matthews' claim based upon the statute of frauds and the broker licensing statute. 
Brief of Appellee, at p. 28. Such circular reasoning puts the cart before the horse, 
and is really nothing more than a reiteration of the ultimate disposition of Mr. 
Matthews' claim on its merits, which is a completely different inquiry than whether 
or not Mr. Matthews has the ability to assert the claim in the first place. 
G. Timing of any extension of the statutory deadline to reject timely 
filed claims. 
Even assuming arguendo that it was appropriate for the district court to 
extend the statutorily prescribed time period within which Olympus was required to 
reject timely filed claims, then similar to the manner in which extensions of other 
deadlines prescribed by statute or rule are typically made, such an extension should 
have been addressed prior to the expiration of the subject deadline rather than 
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essentially granting Olympus an open-ended extension until such time as Olympus, 
in the sole and absolute discretion of Olympus, decided it was time to address third-
party claims (rather than trying to obtain approval for payments to members in 
advance of payments to third-party creditors). 
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE 
DISTRICT COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES AND IN 
IMPOSING FEES ON APPEAL, 
If this Court rules in favor of Mr. Matthews with respect to the failure of 
Olympus to timely reject Mr. Matthews' claim, and orders that Olympus pay Mr. 
Matthews' claim as an approved claim, then such a ruling is dispositive of the 
attorney fees issue and the awards of attorneys fees against Mr. Matthews by both 
the district court and the court of appeals must necessarily be reversed. 
However, even absent a ruling in favor of Mr. Matthews on the prior issue, 
the awards of attorney fees against Mr. Matthews should still be reversed. 
A. Mr, Matthews'arguments had merit. 
We emphasize that although an action must be meritless to award 
attorney fees under section 78-27-56, the mere fact that an action is 
meritless does not necessarily mean that the action is also brought in 
bad faith. Such an interpretation would conflate the two prongs 
required under the statute. 
In re Discipline of Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3, \ 49, 86 P.3d 712 (citations omitted); 
see also Still Standing Stable, LLC v. Allen, 2005 UT 46, fflf 8-10, 122 P.3d 559. 
The opposite approach is equally true—the mere fact that an action may be 
found to be in bad faith does not necessarily mean that the action is without merit, 
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and the two prongs cannot be conflated but rather each determination must stand on 
its own. 
Mr. Matthews does not concede that his claims and/or actions were pursued 
in bad faith; to the contrary Mr. Matthews has consistently maintained an honest 
belief in the propriety of the activities in question, Mr. Matthews never intended to 
take unconscionable advantage of Olympus or anyone else, and Mr. Matthews 
never intended to or acted with the knowledge that the activities in question would 
hinder, delay, or defraud Olympus. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 316 
(Utah 1998) (citing Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983)). 
Nevertheless, in the interests of judicial economy, Mr. Matthews has chosen 
to limit his arguments to this Court primarily to the without merit prong of UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-27-56 (1988), which in and of itself is dispositive of the attorney 
fees issue. 
For the reasons set forth at length in the initial Brief of Appellant on file 
herein, the claims and arguments advanced on behalf of Mr. Matthews did have 
merit. The conclusionary arguments of Olympus as to the ultimate outcome of Mr. 
Matthews' arguments before the district court and court of appeals do not address 
the fact that there was a reasonable basis in both law and fact for Mr. Matthews9 
arguments even though they have thus far been unsuccessful. 
Olympus attempts to conflate the two prongs required under the statute and 
attempts to bootstrap a finding of without merit to a finding of bad faith, essentially 
reducing it to a single inquiry—if a prevailing party can establish bad faith then 
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according to the reasoning of Olympus such party should be entitled to an award of 
attorney fees. That is simply not the standard set forth in UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-
27-56(1988). 
Olympus also relies heavily on the fact that the district court and court of 
appeals ultimately rejected Mr. Matthews' arguments as the primary basis for 
finding that such arguments were without merit, but such a finding merely means 
that Olympus was the prevailing party, and that outcome in and of itself does not 
mean that these arguments lacked merit for purposes of an award of attorney fees 
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56 (1988). 
Olympus even admits that there was no finding by the district court that Mr. 
Matthews' threshold argument that his claim should be deemed approved pursuant 
to the provisions of UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1305 (2001) was without merit for 
purposes of awarding attorney fees against Mr. Matthews; Olympus frankly admits 
that the without merit determination by both the district court and the court of 
appeals applies solely to Mr. Matthews' arguments with respect to the statute of 
frauds and broker licensing statute. Brief of Appellee, at p. 38. Nevertheless, no 
distinction has ever been made between the attorney fees incurred by Olympus with 
respect to the deemed approved argument in comparison to the attorney fees 
incurred with respect to the statute of frauds and broker licensing arguments, but 
rather the district court and court of appeals have inexplicably awarded Olympus 
the full amount of attorney fees incurred in addressing all of Mr. Matthews' 
arguments, including the deemed approved argument. 
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B, RULE 56(G), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
Pursuant to the plain language of Rule 56(g), at best, Olympus would only be 
entitled to recover the additional attorney fees incurred as a result of any delay 
caused by the initial affidavits, not the attorney fees incurred to address the overall 
merits of Mr. Matthews' claim, and Olympus has failed to establish that any such 
additional attorney fees were ever incurred. 
The district court's award of attorney fees does not even attempt to identify a 
specific amount of attorney fees awarded pursuant to Rule 56(g) resulting from any 
purported delay, and the court of appeals' decision is silent as to any award of 
attorney fees based on Rule 56(g). 
It is noteworthy that all oral arguments and ultimate determinations by the 
district court proceeded without the need to be rescheduled or other delay. When 
Mr. Matthews' realized his prior recollection was inadvertently in error, he did 
indeed correct the record in all respects, including amended discovery responses 
and an amended affidavit of Mr. Matthews (R. 3106-3112), and Mr. Matthews did 
not continue to advance any prior inadvertent misstatement once he realized the 
error. 
The bottom line is that even if Mr. Matthews had not inadvertently misspoke 
in his initial affidavit, ultimately Olympus would have made the exact same 
arguments to the district court and on appeal with respect to the deemed approved 
language of UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1305 (2001) as well as the statute of frauds 
and the broker licensing statute. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the arguments on file herein, it is respectfully requested that this 
Court reverse the court of appeals' affirmance of the district court's denial of Mr. 
Matthews' claim and judgment in favor of Olympus, and that this Court remand this 
matter to the district court with instructions to enter an order requiring Olympus to 
pay the full amount of Mr. Matthews' timely filed claim as an approved claim 
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1305 (2001) due to the failure of Olympus to 
timely reject the claim in writing as mandated by statute. 
If the relief requested above is granted, then this Court must also reverse the 
award of attorney fees because Olympus would no longer be a prevailing party as 
required by UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56 (1988). 
Even if the relief requested above is not granted, then this Court should still 
reverse the awards of attorney fees by the district court and the court of appeals 
because the claim and various legal arguments advanced on behalf of Mr. Matthews 
each had a reasonable basis in law and fact and were not "without merit" for 
purposes of awarding attorney fees under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56 (1988). 
Dated this 11th day of June, 2008. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MILLER VANCE & THOMPSON 
/ 
wayne A/v ance 
Counsel for David C. Matthews 
Claimant and Appellant 
-75-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on June 11, 2008,1 caused two (2) copies of the 
foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant to be hand delivered to Steven T. Waterman, 
Steven C. Strong and Brent D. Wride, of Ray Quinney & Nebeker, counsel for 
Olympus Construction, L.C., Appellee herein, at the following address: 
Steven T. Waterman 
Steven C. Strong 
Brent D. Wride 
Ray Quinney & Nebeker 
P.O. Box 45385 
36 S. State Street, Suite 1400 
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